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As you know, my remarks tonight are entitled, "Education for
Professional Responsibility." I selected the title. When I did so I must
have been in an expansive mood. It is much too broad. To discharge
his professional responsibilities a lawyer must be a man of probity,
professional competence, and dedication to the ideals of his profession.
His education in professional responsibility, therefore, is influenced by
all the factors that made him the man that he is: his parents, his home
environment, his cultural development, his church, his formal education,
his brethren of the bench and bar, his participation in the activities of
the organized bar, and the political climate of his time and his country.
Obviously I have not the time tonight to discuss the impact of all these
people, institutions, and activities on the professional education of the
lawyer. Of necessity I must narrow the scope of my remarks. Recog-
nizing that necessity, I have decided to limit my comments to some
observations on the role of the law school in educating the law student
in the professional responsibilities which he should assume on his ad-
mission to the bar. A quick survey of the history of legal education in
this country will, I believe, provide a frame of reference which will
make my observations more meaningful.
When DeTocqueville wrote in 1835 that "Lawyers ... formed the
highest political class and the most cultivated circle of society . . ."
most members of the bench and bar were apprentice-trained. Few had
attended a law school. The University related law school was just be-
ginning to catch on. The proprietary law school, which had enjoyed
some popularity in the first quarter of the nineteenth century, was on
its way out. Study in a lawyer's office was by long odds the most
popular method of preparing for admission to the bar. Typically a fee
was paid for the privilege. Textbooks proscribed by the preceptor were
read. Legal documents were copied in long hand-remember the type-
writer was not invented until 1867. Processes were served, witnesses
were interviewed, brief cases were carried and routine clerical work
was performed. Essentially the student learned by reading, listening,
observing and doing. The quality of his training varied according to the
ability of the preceptor, the nature of his practice, and the interest that
he took in educating the apprentice for the practice of law as an honor-
able and learned profession demanding of its votaries a far higher
standard of conduct than is acceptable in the marketplace.
*Dean and Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law. B.S.,
1925, LL.B., 1927, University of Virginia; J.S.D., 1931, Yale University.
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Although most lawyers in this country continued to be apprentice-
trained until the latter part of the nineteenth century, the university
related law schools slowly gained in popularity. Twenty-one were in
operation at the outbreak of the Civil War. None had any entrance
requirements, except that the applicant be of good moral character
and in some states had attained a stipulated age.
The Civil War was followed by a tremendous growth of American
industry and a growing admiration by Americans for the methods
of natural science. These developments combined to produce a funda-
mental change in American legal education. As industry expanded,
corporate structures, the credit system, and our economy in general
became increasingly complex. These developments resulted in our law
becoming more complex than it had been in the essentially agrarian
pre-war days. Thus preparation for the bar required far more extensive
and rigorous training than had hitherto been thought sufficient. And a
conviction grew that this training could best be given in law schools
applying the methods of science to the study of law. Out of this con-
viction came the casebook method of instruction, which in its inception
was based on three assumptions: First, law is a science; second, all the
materials of a science are contained in books, and third, legal doctrines
gradually evolve and develop from a relatively few basic principles,
which can be learned by studying a relatively small number of appellate
court opinions. Observe that the casebook method of instruction, as
developed in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, regarded law
as a self-contained discipline, expressed in appellate court opinions,
constitutional provisions, and a few statutes.
By the turn of the century the casebook method of instruction had
gained ascendency in American law schools over its rival, the so-called
lecture or textbook system. Also, by the turn of the century, an aware-
ness was developing that the narrowly technical legal dialectic of the
original casebook method was vulnerable to the criticism that it largely
ignored the social, economic, and political matrix in which law operates
and develops. This realization was well expressed in 1923 by Harlan
Fisk Stone, then Dean of the Columbia Law School, in the following
words:
Present day problems of legal education .... arise ... from our
traditional attitude toward the law as a body of technical doctrine
more or less detached from those social forces which it regulates.
We fail to recognize, as clearly as we might, that law is nothing
more than a form of social control intimately related to those
social functions which are the subject matter of economics, and
the social sciences generally.
Recognition of the verity of Stone's observation is attested by law
teachers' growing awareness of the contributions the social and be-
havioral sciences are able to make to the understanding of legal prob-
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lems. Witness, for example, the inclusion of social science materials in
the modern casebook and the appointment of economists, sociologists,
political scientists, psychiatrists and psychologists to law faculties. More
often than not these appointments are joint in law and the basic disci-
pline of the appointee. The joint nature of the appointment serves to
emphasize the capability of interdisciplinary undertakings improving
legal institutions.
Perhaps, however, the most significant law school development of
the twentieth century is the upgrading of the academic requirements
of law schools and what amounts to their accreditation by the American
Bar Association and the Association of American Law Schools.
The improvement of law school standards was one of the principal
reasons for the organization of the American Bar Association in 1878.
Progress was so painfully slow that in 1893 a section of legal education
and admission to the bar was created by the association. This election,
the first in the history of the American Bar Association, established
the Association of American Law Schools in 1900. The original articles
of that Association limited membership to schools which required at
least a high school education, or its equivalent, for admissions, which
required a course of instruction covering at least sixty weeks spread
over two years for the law degree, and which provided its students
with access to a library that contained at least the reports of the
Supreme Court of the United States and the reports of the courts of
last resort of the state in which the school was located. In 1906 the
Law School Association increased the required period of law study
from two to three years. Since then quantitative requirements for
membership have been gradually raised and in 1962 the Association
adopted articles shifting the emphasis from quantitative minimums to
qualitative norms.
The formation of the Association of American Law Schools did
not terminate the American Bar Association's interest in improving
legal education, and in 1921 the American Bar Association adopted a
series of resolutions establishing minimum standards to be observed
by law schools. In 1923 the council of the section of legal education
and admission to the bar published a list of the schools satisfying these
standards. Each year since then'the American Bar Association has
published a list of approved schools. About half the states now limit
eligibility to take the Bar Examination to graduates of schools approved
by the American Bar Association. And all but a very small fraction of
those coming to the bar in this country today are law school graduates.
Apprentice training for admission to the bar has virtually disappeared.




Clearly the mission of a law school is educating the law student
for the performance of the professional responsibilities of a lawyer.
These responsibilities relate to the role of the lawyer in society. They
may be subdivided into professional competence and professional ethics.
By professional ethics I mean all of the professional obligations of a
lawyer except competence.
In my view each law school should offer a separate required course
in professional ethics. This course should be dedicated to developing
an understanding of the wholehearted commitment to the imperatives
of professional ethics, including, of course, the obligation of the lawyer
to serve the public by working for law revision and reform, by pro-
viding the leadership in public affairs for which his education has so
well prepared him, and by assuring adequate representation in criminal
and civil matters of indigents, of unpopular causes, and of unpopular
people. The canons of professional ethics should be studied critically
and in depth. The reason for each canon should be understood and
its validity measured against the basic obligation of the lawyer to serve
the public. The student should understand that the duties defined by
the canons range from the avoidance of downright dishonesty to the
observance of conventions associated with an honorable and dignified
profession. They should understand also that these conventions and
their application should be responsive to changes in the social order and
may vary from place to place and from time to time. Four questions
will suggest what I have in mind:
First, the industrial revolution followed by the technological revolu-
tion have given us an age of specialization in law as well as in science
and in business and in medicine and other vocations. Recalling the
canonical admonitions against advertising and solicitation (Canon 27)
when, if at all, should the legal specialist be permitted to list himself
as a specialist?
Second, is that recent development of the Office of Economic Op-
portunity, the neighborhood law office, guilty of advertising and solicit-
ing when it makes its services known to indigents in the community
which it serves?
Third, in the words of Mr. Justice Brennan, does the fact that the
O.E.O. lawyer representing an indigent, ".... received his compensation
from government pose a threat to that independence in representation
which is the very heart and core of the lawyer's role in a democratic
society?" The Justice concludes that O.E.O. guidelines provide ade-
quate safeguards and that therefore the answer to the question under
discussion should be a resounding no. But in an address which he de-
livered before his appointment to the Supreme Court he called attention
to the danger of government subsidizing representation for indigents
in these words: "The plain fact is that an independent bar is just as
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essential to the preservation of freedom as is an independent judiciary,.
or the Bills of Rights in our federal and state constitutions. The bar
is the creation of a democratic people to intervene as a champion be-.,
tween the individual and his government... the fear is that a govern-
ment agency of lawyers paid with tax money may be followed by
governmental control of the profession. The fear is not so much on the
part of the lawyers, but of thoughtful citizens concerned with the
preservation and protection of our democratic form of government.
If the government becomes the lawyer's paymaster, it may become his
master."
Alexander Hamilton put it--"In the general course of human
nature a power over a man's subsistence amounts to a power over his
will... if a citizen opposes his government, and the lawyers for both
parties are paid by the government, will the citizen get that fearless
and resolute representation by his counsel which history proves is
essential to the proper administration of justice? If the government
paid attorneys do this work, receiving their salaries from the public
treasury, will that, despite its innocence, be the first step, the entering
wedge, leading to a subservient bar with all that such a bar foretells in
the threat to individual liberties not alone of lawyers, but of everyone?"
Fourth, and the last question is this: What is the full impact of the
1964 decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the Brother-
hood of Railway Trainmen vs. Virginia (377 U.S. 1) on the rulings
that organizations offering the services of lawyers to their members
were engaged in the unauthorized practice of law?
Hopefully, the questions which I have just asked dispell the notion
held by some law students and members of the bar that professional
ethics is a study without intellectual challenge of goody-goody exhorta-
tions enshrined a half century ago in the canons of professional ethics
of the American Bar Association. Quite the contrary is the case, as
will be attended, I am sure, by all who have studied the subject. Now,
fortunately there is a resurgence of interest in the subject, stimulated
in part at least by Ford Foundation grants and by the appointment two
years ago of a committee of the American Bar Association to evaluate
the existing canons of professional ethics and test them against the
realities of contemporary practice in recognition always of the basic
obligation of the legal profession to serve the public.
Not only do I urge the offering of a separate course in professional
ethics, but I also urge what has become known as the pervasive ap-
proach to the subject. That is, I believe that ethical considerations
should be discussed whenever relevant to the situation being studied,
regardless of the course in which the situation is considered. A separate
course in professional responsibility, plus the pervasive approach to
the subject may result in some repetition and duplication of effort; but
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in my view these disadvantages are more than offset by the enriched
understanding of ethical considerations which the one-two punch will
provide.
I turn now to a consideration of the law school's role in educating
the student to be professionally competent. As you know, that is the
target of most law school instruction. And generally speaking I think
it is agreed that the modern law school is usually on target; but, of
course, there is always room for improvement.
Probably the Law School of today is at its best in educating the
student to think clearly and exactly, to analyze and synthesize, to sift
the relevant from the irrelevant, to beware of over-generalizing and
to seek constantly for the reasons in policy and doctrine underlying
legal rules and principles. In short, to think like a lawyer.
Critics of the modern law school insist that it fails effectively to
teach legal know-how. The courses in trial, appellate and office practice,
and the participation by students in legal clinics and moot courts are
cited in answer to this criticism, but it must be conceded that the old
apprentice system, properly administered, excelled the law school of
today in giving "how to do it" instruction. There is no substitute for
the live client, the actual case, and the tutorial relationship ideally
existing between the apprentice and his mentor. The actual cases stu-
dents encounter in the legal aid clinics of today fail to provide the
breadth of experience that the apprentice received in the office of a
general practitioner. For the most part the cases coming in to the legal
aid clinics are limited to collections, family problems, landlord and
tenant controversies, and like matters. The businessman, the corpora-
tion, and the economic royalists do not come to the legal aid clinic; nor
typically does the tort claimant as the institution of the contingent fee
ordinarily assures him counsel of his choice.
To ask, as some do, that the law school give clinical training com-
parable to that now received by medical students, is in my view to ask
the impossible. Generally speaking mental and physical ills are common
to all mankind, poor and rich alike. Hence a medical clinic can give the
intern a breadth of training which a legal clinic cannot hope to emulate.
Only the law office can give the legal neophyte training equivalent to
that received by the medical intern. The law schools emphasis, there-
fore, is likely to continue to be of know-why and know-what, rather
than know-how. But this is merely a matter of emphasis. Most law
students are now receiving at least elementary training in a number of
lawyer-like skills. In my judgment, however, the law office and the
bridge the gap continuing legal education programs provide, and will
probably continue to provide, the most effective how-to-do-it training
for the legal neophyte. I hasten to add that the defender programs with
which I am familiar are doing what I regard as a rather remarkable
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job in providing how-to-do-it training in criminal cases. Also at long
last a number of law schools are making significant contributions in
this respect. My earlier observations concerning apprentice-type train-
ing related to the civil practice. Few law offices provide how-to-do-it
training in criminal cases. And in these post Gideon v. Wainwright
days all coming to the bar should have received training in the trial
of criminal cases.
So far as I am concerned the most valid criticism of the modem
law school is that the faculty is much too small in relation to the size
of the student body. The result is that classes are too large and that
classroom instruction is continued throughout the student's three years
in law school, whereas, to my mind, more individualized instruction
should be offered to upper classmen.
The Socratic dialogue of the casebook system demands active student
participation in classroom discussions. Large teaching units tend to
stifle that participation. The discussion is likely to be dominated by the
aggressive few in the class. Most members of the class tend to remain
silent until called on. And in a large class they may not be called on
more than once or twice during an entire semester. Most members of
the class thus assume the role of spectators rather than participants
most of the time. As spectators they derive a useful, vicarious experi-
ence, but those participating in the class discussion are the principal
beneficiaries of the case system.
To my mind the case system is without peer in educating first year
law students in analysis, synthesis and critical appraisal. Admittedly,
however, it is extravagant of time and may well be modified in the
second year by omitting the statement of cases and by focusing attention
upon a series of problems to be discussed in light of the materials con-
tained in the coursebook.
Many third year students find that classroom instruction no longer
challenges their interest. A change in pace is desirable, and I am con-
vinced that seniors in law school are prepared to realize optimum bene-
fits from pursuing individual research projects with the close partici-
pation of legal clinics and moot courts, and should, I think, round out
the balance of a third year student's program.
Observe that the senior research program which I have in mind
would, I believe, in the words of my colleague, Professor Rahl, "result
in the emergence of faculty-student research teams, opening a whole
new dimension in legal research. In the past, the failure of law schools
to utilize effectively the great research potential represented by their
senior students can only be described as intellectual and social waste.
The price paid has included not only the well-known phenomenon of
'senior boredom' but more importantly a significant loss of opportun-
ity to develop to a new level the powers of the students. Perhaps most
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serious of all has been the incalculable loss to society, which we be-
lieve may reasonably expect to receive broader contributions from the
law schools as centers of learning in democratic processes and the
administration of justice than it has been receiving."
Professor Rahl, the chairman of the objectives and curriculum
committee of our law school, voices the criticism which I have directed
at the modern law school in the following words: ". . . An area of
relative weakness exists in the work of the law schools everywhere, in
their failure to challenge to the full the senior students at the very
moment they have reached the peak of their academic powers. This
problem is partially, though not entirely, overcome for a relative few
who work on the Law Review, or in Moot Court competition. For the
many, there has been only the same old diet of formal courses and an
occasional seminar. Little opportunity has existed for them to be
pushed deeply into a problem with the intensity soon to be required of
them as lawyers. Little opportunity has been afforded to work in close
mind-to-mind contact with a senior member of the profession in order
to sharpen further those powers of analysis, communication, and
problem-solving which are the earmark of the good American lawyer
throughout the world. These weaknesses exist in every law school;
they -are there because the schools have'not basically changed their
methods in this respect since the turn of the century. Change has been
nearly impossible because the law schools have become committed to
relatively large student bodies and relatively small faculties, whose man-
power is spread too thin for much individual work with students . . .
law school student-faculty ratios today will not stand comparison with
leading schools in the arts and sciences, even at the undergraduate
level."
"Comparison with medical and dental schools produces contrasts
which show that we have sat still too long; for example, law school
ratios of full-time students to full-time professors are in the range of
from around 35 to 1 in the largest schools, down to around 20 to 1, in
the leading smaller schools, such as Northwestern. In the medical
schools, however, the ratios are from 2.5 to 4 to 1, or in other words 8
to 10 times as many full-time professors per student as in the law
schools. This is because medical schools are committed to engage in
a great amount of laboratory and clinical work with their students, and
research on a broad scale is conducted by faculty members."
"We do not need such a ratio as that because of inherent differences
in law and medicine. But, why should we not also commit ourselves
to work with our students individually, and 'clinically', so to speak?
And why should we not commit our law school to engage in research
on the level on which it is done in other types of professional and
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graduate schools, enlisting in that research to some extent the great
pool of talent represented by our senior students?"
You may well disagree with the criticism that Rahl and I have
directed at the modern law school, and you may also disagree with the
third year program that we have suggested, but I have every confidence
that you will agree with me that the overriding obligation of the Ameri-
can law school is to strive to inspire its students to practice law as an
honorable profession demanding of its members selfless devotion to
the ideals of liberty, justice and the rule of law
